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  We discuss the issue of time consistency of monetary policy. We develop a 
simple and intuitive procedure to derive analytically the unconditionally optimal 
(UO) policy in a general linear-quadratic set-up, a perspective stressed by 
Taylor (1979) and Whiteman (1986). We compare the UO perspective on 
optimal monetary policy with alternative approaches. We use our approach in 
simple backward- and forward-looking models and argue that the UO 
perspective is worthy of renewed interest. 
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Kydland and Prescott (1977) brought into sharp focus the issue of time
inconsistency of optimal policy in macroeconomic models with forward-looking
behavior and rational expectations. In so doing, they transformed the debate on
how ￿ good￿dynamic policy ought to be formulated and conducted. Many insights,
and literatures, grew out of the Kydland and Prescott paper; a key insight, of
course, was the desirability of rules in the conduct of policy. The question is:
How should one form these rules? In this paper we take up a theme from Taylor
(1979) and pursued in Whiteman (1986). They proposed searching for policies,
under rational expectations, which maximize the unconditional expectation of
the government￿ s objective function. More recently, however, an alternative
perspective has been adopted in theoretical research on time-consistent monetary
policy. Woodford (2003), concerned with the formulation of credible policies,
proposes a dynamic optimization-based method for solving for optimal policy,
which he has labelled a "timeless perspective for optimal policy" (TP-policy).
However, the debate continues as to the appropriate criterion for policymakers.
For example, see the contributions of Soderlind (1999), Blake (2001), Jensen and
McCallum (2002, 2006) and Walsh (2005); Currie and Levine (1993) is an early
recognition and analysis of many of the issues that have arisen in the subsequent
literature.
First, in section 2, we exposit di⁄erent ways of addressing the time
inconsistency issue. We ￿rst look at TP-policy strategies as this usefully sets
out the key issues in forward-looking models. We also look brie￿ y at some of the
concerns with the TP approach. However, our main focus is to show how one
can derive analytically policies that minimize the unconditional expectation of
losses, what we refer to as unconditionally optimal policy or optimal unconditional
2continuation policy (UO-policy). This is the ￿rst contribution of this paper. To
accomplish this, as we shall see, involves taking expectations over all feasible initial
conditions in constructing the optimal policy program. We derive these optimal
continuation policies in a general linear-quadratic set-up. For concreteness, we
then specialize these results to recover the policies advocated by Blake (2001)
and Jensen and McCallum (2002) and proved to be optimal by Whiteman (1986).
Whiteman￿ s proof of optimality is somewhat algebraically involved whilst our
approach is straightforward, intuitive and easy to implement and generalize. We
also explain the sense in which consumers￿discount rates do not matter when we
construct UO-policy, an observation going back to Taylor￿ s (1979) contribution
but which has not been formally set out.
In section 3 we pursue further the potential rationale for adopting UO-policies.
In formulating optimal policies it may seem natural to adopt as the criterion
of policy the conditional expected discounted value of losses. However, as is
well known, when there are forward-looking structural relationships the issue
of time consistency is present. One approach is to minimize conditional losses
subject to policy rules that have constant coe¢ cients. However, as we show,
such rules are what we call ￿ conditionally inconsistent￿(i.e., the parameters of
the optimal (simple) rule are dependent on initial conditions). This is a form of
time-inconsistency but it is useful to give it a separate label to distinguish it from
the case where the form of the optimal rule (e.g., the nature of the ￿rst-order
conditions for a policy optimum) are di⁄erent in some start-up period(s)1.
One response to this di¢ culty is simply to ￿ ignore￿the part of discounted
expected losses that re￿ ects these initial conditions; the timeless perspective o⁄ers
1Some further examples may be useful. In a forward-looking model, the optimal policy is
time-inconsistent but conditionally consistent, whilst the rule that minimizes the conditional
discounted loss function is time consistent but conditionally inconsistent. So, conditional
inconsistency is a form of time inconsistency.
3a justi￿cation for this approach and, as a result, adopts as the criterion of policy
the conditional variance of the arguments in the loss function. However, that is
not the only response to this di¢ culty, and it may not be the most natural. If one
adopts the unconditional value of losses as the criterion of policy, one recovers rules
for policy that are time consistent, conditionally consistent and optimal within
the class of policies under investigation.
In the case when the equations describing the economy are purely backward-
looking it may seem that the UO-perspective has little to o⁄er. In that case
optimal policy, calculated using the discounted conditional loss function, is time-
consistent (and conditionally consistent). However, even in this situation it may
be possible to argue that minimizing unconditional losses is still desirable. We
show that there is a trade-o⁄ between the best policy given the initial conditions
and the ￿ most desirable￿distribution from which the initial conditions are drawn.
In addition, we show that the UO-policy converges to the one which maximizes
the conditional loss function when the time discount rate tends to unity. In
general, it is an interesting, and important, philosophical question whether we
should discount the welfare of future generations, and how we should de￿ne the
aggregate discount rate. Such issues were famously noted by Ramsey (1928) and
more recently by Somers (1971) and Barro (1999).
Finally, in section 4 we brie￿ y recap our key arguments and conclude.
2. Di⁄erent ways to cope with time inconsistency
Most macroeconomic models that are useful for policy analysis seem to face the
issue of time inconsistency. Hence, monetary policy analysis has for a long time
recognized that one needs to address the incentives/criterion facing policymakers.
Early suggestions included appointing a conservative central banker, proposed by
Kenneth Rogo⁄, or the contracting approach urged by Carl Walsh. Woodford
4(2003) proposes that policymakers should adopt the timelessly optimal policy;
that is, the policy that would have been decided upon for the current period
had such a binding decision been taken in￿nitely far in the past. The timelessly
optimal rule emphasizes both commitment and ￿ exibility; policymakers ought to
implement policies to which it would have been optimal to commit, had a binding
decision been made far in the past. However, that does not require policymakers
to apply rules regardless of what other changes may occur in the economy. If there
are structural changes, for instance, then policy ought to be employed as if that
change had been known about in￿nitely far in the past. It is important to note
that this perspective on optimal policy, like those employed below, remains time
inconsistent in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977). However, they are time
consistent in a more limited sense; the policy is sustainable, since it may perform
better than discretionary policy, which the government will implement should it
deviate from commitment. McCallum and Jensen (2006) emphasized this point
and we take it up below.
2.1. The model
We turn now to formalize the timeless perspective in a general linear-quadratic



















Et is the expectations operator conditional on information up through date t, ￿ is
the time discount factor, xt is a vector of target variables, x￿ is a vector of target











Here zt is a vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables, the value of which
may depend upon both policy actions and exogenous disturbances at date t, Zt is
a vector of predetermined endogenous variables (lags of variables that are included
in zt and it) and it is a vector of policy instruments, the value of which is chosen
in period t:
We further assume that the evolution of the endogenous variables zt and Zt is






















and st is a vector of exogenous disturbances.
The policy maker minimizes the loss function (2.1) subject to constraint (2.2)










sst = ￿: (2.3)













on time and/or initial conditions.
2.2. Timeless-perspective policy
One way to construct a policy which does not depend on time or initial conditions
has been proposed in Woodford (2003). The following algorithm, which is well-
known, will recover the optimal policy from a timeless perspective:



































; and ￿t+j is a vector of Lagrange
multipliers associated with the constraints (2.2).






￿0 Q + ￿
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t+j e A ￿ ￿
￿1￿
0




0 Q + ￿
0
t e A = 0; for j = 0: (2.6)
￿ Step 3: Ensure commitment to the policy program by ￿ ignoring￿the ￿rst-




0 Q + ￿
0
t e A ￿ ￿
￿1￿
0
t￿1e I = 0: (2.7)
The following example demonstrates this algorithm in practice.














and a forward-looking Phillips curve given by
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + et; (2.9)
where ￿t is in￿ ation at time t, yt is the output gap, and et is a stationary identically
7distributed shock process with ￿nite2 variance, ￿2: The Lagrangian for the policy













+ ￿t+j [￿t+j ￿ ￿Et￿t+1+j ￿ ￿yt+j ￿ et+j]
￿
: (2.10)
The commitment solution, or timelessly optimal solution is, in e⁄ect, to ignore
the ￿rst-order conditions for j = 0. So, in any time period, we have the following
















(yt ￿ yt￿1): (2.12)
(2.12) relates the path of in￿ ation and output to one another in a manner that is
commonly characterized as the timelessly optimal program.
TP-policy has an interesting property, it minimizes the conditional loss
function in the case when the economy starts from steady state, (xt;st) = ￿(0;0),
for in this case ￿t￿1 = 0 and (2.6) would be identical to (2.7). In this case, since the
targeted variables can be represented as a linear combination of initial variables
and future shocks, their expected value would be zero, Etxt+j = 0: Therefore,
the conditional expectation of the loss function in this case would coincide with
its conditional variance, as pointed out in Woodford (2003). Consequently, TP
2In wider sense we assume that et can be represented as a linear combination of white noise
processes, such that et =
1 X
j=0
Ajut￿j; where futg are i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance,





8policy would be optimal if the government were minimising conditional variance
of the loss function ignoring its mean.
TP policy may be thought of as the ￿ opposite￿of discretionary policy in the
following sense. While discretionary policy gives the largest weight to utility in
period zero, e⁄ectively ignoring the consequences for the future, the TP policy
minimizes the discounted value of all future losses ignoring the value of initial
conditions, the distribution of which depends on the policy adopted. In the
following section we will discuss the policy which, from our perspective (see
also Jensen and McCallum (2002, 2006)), represents a mixture of those two
approaches as it minimizes the loss function "on average" or across all possible
initial conditions. More precisely, it minimizes the integral of the loss function
(2.1) over the distribution of initial values which is itself generated by the chosen
policy.
2.3. Unconditionally optimal policy
Soderlind (1999) analyzes ￿ optimal simple rules￿ in a rational expectations
model and argues that the optimal policy parameters depend on initial values.
For instance, in the example just considered, Woodford￿ s timeless perspective
methodology always dominates when yt￿1 = 0, for, in this case, the timeless
perspective policy is the same as the optimal (￿ time inconsistent￿ ) policy. Jensen
and McCallum (2002) and Blake and Kirsanova (2004), using the methodology
described in Soderlind (1999), provide examples where, for particular initial
conditions, there is a time consistent linear policy which results in smaller losses
than TP-policy "on average". We shall return to this point in more detail below.
Since we cannot ￿nd, in general, time-consistent policy which is dominant for
all initial conditions, it is natural to search for a class of policies which do well,
in some sense, "on average", in e⁄ect treating initial conditions as a new random
9variable. The policy which we now seek to justify is one which minimizes the
unconditional expectation of the loss function; this is equal to the expectation
over all possible initial states of the economy (Taylor, 1979). More formally, then,
the optimal policy from a timeless perspective that we are looking for can be









s;￿;) which minimizes the unconditional
expectation (e E) of the loss function (2.1), subject to constraint (2.2):
￿
0￿ = argmin e ELt(￿
0): (2.13)
We shall call such a policy "Unconditionally Optimal" and denote it UO-policy.
This basic approach to policy evaluation, focussing on the asymptotic variance
of the arguments in a loss function, has been adopted many times recently
(Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), Woodford (1999), Clarida, Gali and
Getler (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Kollman (2002)). However,
there is now much evidence to suggest that UO-policy and TP-policy are di⁄erent.
First, in a little cited contribution, Whiteman (1986) has shown that, for
precisely the economy considered in Example 2.1, the policy which minimizes the




(yt ￿ ￿yt￿1); (2.14)
rather than by (2.12) which corresponds to the TP-policy. Using a numerical
algorithm Blake (2001) shows that policy (2.14) satis￿es the ￿rst-order and second-
order conditions for an unconditional optimum. Jensen and McCallum (2002)
also make this point by computing the exact losses numerically for the case just
analyzed.
Second, the Lagrangian constructed in Woodford￿ s timeless perspective
methodology depends on the consumers￿discount factor, but the optimal policy
which minimizes unconditional losses does not. The formal statement of that
10result is provided in Proposition (2.2) which we ascribe to John Taylor as he
is the ￿rst explicit reference (within the context of linear rational expectations
models) to the issue of unconditionality emphasized above of which we are aware.
Proposition 2.2. (Taylor, 1979) The time preference parameter in loss function
(2.1) is not important for the UO policymaker. That is, the best UO policy
minimizes losses (2.15) for all discount factors ￿ 2 (0;1)





Here, lt denotes the period loss function.
Proof. It follows immediately that,
argmin
￿0




e Elt = argmin
￿0
e Elt:
Hence, we have proved that the same policy is unconditionally optimal for Lt (￿)
for any ￿ 2 (0;1)
Proposition (2.2) is additionally interesting as it demonstrates that the same
policy is unconditionally optimal for all households, regardless of their individual
time discount factors. For example, we may consider an overlapping generations





where ￿(j) represents the time discount factor for j years ahead. If we assume that
the time discount rate does not depend on current welfare, the unconditionally
optimal policy would not depend on the time-discounting function
argmax
￿0










11The ￿ best-on-average￿criterion avoids the need for one to take a stand on what is
the appropriate social discount rate; see the interesting discussions of these issues
in Barro (1999) and Somers (1971).
Blake (2001), following the earlier approach of Taylor (1979), emphasizes that
the unconditionally optimal time-consistent policy should coincide with a TP
policy as the policymaker￿ s discount factor approaches unity. However a formal
proof of that assertion has not been provided so far3. We will provide one in the
next section.
2.3.1. Formulating unconditionally optimal policies
In this section we shall show that a policymaker aiming to minimize unconditional
losses should formulate an unconditional criterion to begin with and then calculate
the ￿rst-order necessary conditions. In other words one should not try ￿rst to
￿nd the optimality conditions for a time inconsistent or conditional policy and
then make the rule time-invariant by ignoring ￿rst period constraints. It would
be as if one were trying to ￿nd an optimum of a composite function, that is
argminf(g(x)), by writing the ￿rst-order conditions for g(x) only. From an
unconditional perspective, the correct approach is to apply the unconditional
expectations operator in formulating the policy Lagrangian and then derive the
optimality conditions.
Hence, we propose the following methodology:
￿ Step 1: Write the conditional Lagrangian (2.4).
￿ Step 2: Re-formulate this as an unconditional Lagrangian:
J = e EJt;
3That is, with the exception of Whiteman (1986), who provided a formal proof for the model
economy considered in example 2.1 with stationary and identically distributed shocks.






































￿ Step 3: Write the ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal timeless policy with
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0









0 Q + ￿
0
t e At ￿ ￿
0
t￿1e I = 0: (2.17)
The general conclusion can be formulated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3. The ￿rst order conditions (2.17) are the necessary conditions
for problem 2.13, subject to 2.2.
Proof. The proof follows immediately by applying Pontryagin￿ s Maximum
Principle.
We contrast equations (2.17) with (2.7) above. It is easy to see that TP-policy
tends to UO-policy when discount rate tends to unity, ￿ ￿! 1:
As we shall see, Proposition 2.3 is exactly the justi￿cation required to
demonstrate that the Blake-Jensen-McCallum result is the policy to minimize
unconditional losses.
132.3.2. Example with forward looking Phillips Curve














subject to the constraint
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + et: (2.19)












+ ￿t+j (￿t+j ￿ ￿Et￿t+j+1 ￿ ￿yt+j ￿ et+j)
￿
:
Since we search for the unconditionally optimal policy, we need to minimize the
"unconditional" Lagrangian, which means we must formulate the problem using
the unconditional expectation of the Lagrangian, Jt :


















The unconditional expectations operator has the following property 8t;j;
e Ext = e Ext+j which implies that e EEt￿t+j￿t+j+1 = e E￿t￿t￿1: The unconditional












+ ￿t (￿t ￿ ￿yt ￿ et) ￿ e E￿￿t￿t￿1
i
:











+ ￿t (￿t ￿ ￿yt ￿ et) ￿ ￿￿t￿t￿1
￿
:












= (2￿yt ￿ ￿￿t) = 0:








This is the optimal program proposed by Blake-Jensen-McCallum, and proved to
be optimal by Whiteman (1986).
Let us consider further the origins of equations such as (2.21) in a slightly more
general setting. Consider the problem of minimizing the unconditional expectation
of a variable, z, which depends on an endogenous policy variable, p; and exogenous
realisation of the fundamental i.i.d. shocks history ut￿ = fut￿kg
1
k=0, where shocks
et can be expressed as et =
1 P
j=0
Ajut￿j: The unconditional expectations operator




where d￿ is the Cartesian product of (dut￿k)
1
k=0 ; and where the ut are the basic
i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and unit second moment.
We emphasize that d￿ is given exogenously and does not change with policy.
To maximize the integral we need to maximize the corresponding Hamiltonian,
which is the expression under the integral, z(p). Intuitively this is plausible as
the policy which minimizes the objective in every state of nature (the components
of the sum), will also minimize the expectation (i.e., the sum or integral). Hence,
we employ the ￿rst order conditions for the Hamiltonian,
@z(p)
@p = 0:
For instance, if we assume that the et = ut , where shocks ut are (serially)
uncorrelated in example 2.4, the information space at time t will be described by
the pair (yt￿1;et): It follows that the dynamic relation for the output gap is given
by
yt = ￿yt￿1 + ￿et; (2.22)
15where ￿ and ￿ are endogenously chosen policy parameters. Equation (2.22) in






Therefore, the loss function can be explicitly expressed in terms of the policy
parameters and the realization of shocks, Lt(￿;￿; ut￿): The unconditional




Instead of calculating the explicit expression (2.24) for unconditional losses in
terms of policy parameters and shocks, we may employ the Lagrange method and














+ ￿t+j (￿t+j ￿ ￿￿t+j+1 ￿ ￿yt+j ￿ et+j)
+￿t+j (￿yt+j + ￿yt+j￿1 + ￿et+j)d￿: (2.25)
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to policy parameters, ￿ and ￿; will reveal
that the Lagrange multiplier in period t + 1, ￿t+1 is uncorrelated with the
information set at time t , (Et￿t+1et = 0, Et￿t+1yt = 0); and hence it is expected
to be zero, Et￿t+j = 0: Therefore, expression (2.22) is not binding and expression
(2.25) can be simpli￿ed as in (2.20).
Finally, we note that in general measure d￿ has the following property: If xt







Biut￿i; then e Extyt =
1 P
i=0









are bounded. For further details see Hamilton (1999).
163. Some Arguments in Favour of Unconditional Expectation
In this section we will argue that a credible policy should satisfy certain key
properties. If one aims to construct a policy program which is the result of
maximization of government objectives, then that policy should have the following
properties: First, it should be time consistent; second, the same rules should be
de￿ned for all initial conditions; and ￿nally, it should maximize the government
objective function on the class of policies under consideration. Formally, the
optimal policy should satisfy the following:
De￿nition 3.1. Policy ￿ is "time consistent" i⁄ 8j > 0, ￿(t) = ￿(t + j):
De￿nition 3.2. Policy ￿ is "conditionally consistent" i⁄ it does not depend on
initial condition, 8xt;st; ￿(xt;st) = ￿(0;0):
De￿nition 3.3. Policy ￿ is sustainable with respect to loss function L in the
class ￿;￿ 2 ￿; i⁄ it is the best one in this class, 8￿
0 2 ￿; L(￿) ￿ L(￿
0):
In other words, one requires that the policy which maximizes a given objective
function should depend neither on time (this property is, of course, simply time
consistency) nor on initial conditions (we call this "conditional consistency"). If
"conditional consistency" is violated, the government has an incentive to revise
the policy rule as initial conditions change and this imposes a credibility problem
similar to the one created by the violation of time consistency.
To illustrate the de￿nitions, we can say that in a pure (linear) backward-
looking model (a model lacking non-predetermined endogenous variables, zt) the
optimal policy is both time consistent and conditionally consistent. Kydland and
Prescott (1977) have shown that in models with forward looking variables policy
which minimizes the conditional loss function is time inconsistent. In view of
17our analysis, we may add that it is "conditionally consistent" and sustainable
with respect to the conditional loss function on the class of linear policies. TP-
policy is both time and conditionally consistent by construction, however it does
not minimize the conditional loss function for almost all initial conditions and
therefore it is not sustainable with respect to the conditional loss function.
3.1. The principle di⁄erence between forward-looking or mixed and
pure backward-looking constraints
We now underline an important principal di⁄erence between forward looking and
backward looking models. It is well known that the optimal policy in an economy
with only backward looking constraints is time consistent in contrast to models
which contain some forward-looking components. In this section we will show
that while the best conditional policy for a pure backward-looking economy is the
same for all initial conditions, this is not the case for time consistent policies in
forward-looking economies.
In particular, the policy parameters of the time consistent policy which
minimize the conditional discounted losses depend on initial conditions. This was
noted in Soderlind (1999) and demonstrated numerically in Blake and Kirsanova
(2004), where Woodford￿ s timeless perspective policy is shown to be conditionally
optimal when the economy starts from steady state, (yt￿1 = 0): However, clearly
that is a special case. Therefore, conditionally optimal time consistent policy
is subject to the same time inconsistency problem as the best time inconsistent
policy itself; as conditions change, the policymaker has an incentive to revise the
policy-rules and the credibility issue is not eradicated.
183.2. Example with pure Backward Looking Phillips Curve
In the following example, the Phillips curve is purely backward-looking. In this
example, the optimal conditional policy is time and conditionally consistent and
sustainable with respect to the conditional loss function, which makes this policy
credible.
Example 3.4. The problem, then, is described by the loss function (3.1) and the
simple backward-looking Phillips relation (3.2)4:














yt = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 + et: (3.2)
The unconditional Lagrangian may be formulated following the approach outlined
earlier,

























+ ￿t (yt ￿ ￿t ￿ et) + Et￿t+1￿t
￿
:











+ ￿t (yt ￿ ￿t ￿ et) + Et￿t+1￿t; (3.3)
and so we write the ￿rst order conditions
@z
@yt
= yt + ￿t = 0;
@z
@￿t
= ￿t ￿ ￿t + Et￿t+1:
We now compare two policies: The ￿rst which is conditionally the best
pc : ￿t = ￿yt + ￿Etyt+1; (3.4)
4To simplify we assume ￿ = 1:
19and the second, which is unconditionally the best
pu : ￿t = ￿yt + Etyt+1: (3.5)
For simplicity we consider the case when the et shocks are i.i.d. with zero mean
and ￿nite second moment, ￿2: The calculations are relatively straightforward and
we relegate them to the appendix. As we show there, the best conditional and
the best unconditional outturns for in￿ ation and output may be represented as
follows:





where d = du = 3￿
p
5





for the best conditional policy. The distribution of initial in￿ ation can then be









It follows that in￿ ation has lower dispersion when the government implements the
unconditionally optimal policy.











and this attains a minimum when d = du.
Similarly, the conditional loss function can be shown to be
EtLt =









which attains its minimumwhen d = dc and it does not depend on initial condition,
￿t￿1: When ￿ ￿! 1; it is easy to see that EtLt ￿! e ELt:
20In this example the asymptotic variance of output and in￿ ation is lower under
the unconditionally optimal plan, as compared with the plan that minimizes the
conditional discounted loss function. This is clear from equation (3.6). So, even in
this simple example, where optimal policy is time consistent, depending on one￿ s
perspective on the appropriate criterion of government (and the appropriateness
of discounting) one could still o⁄er a justi￿cation for unconditionally optimal
programs.
Policy (3.4), denoted pc, minimizes Lt(￿t￿1) for any given initial in￿ ation,
￿t￿1 = ￿t￿1(p;et￿); which depends on the policy adopted and the history
of realized shocks, (et￿); while policy (3.5), denoted pu, minimizes Lu =
R
Lt(￿t￿1)dF (￿t￿1), where dF (￿t￿1) is a measure of initial in￿ ation rates; in other
words, it minimizes the loss function "on average". The conventional wisdom
is that Lt(￿t￿1;et￿;pc) < Lt(￿t￿1;et￿;p);8p;￿t￿1;et￿. What we have argued
above is that Lu(pu) < Lu(p);8p: The di⁄erence is explained by considering what
may be thought of as ￿ externalities￿ ; that is, policy will in￿ uence in￿ ation and
output in a certain way so that the policymaker determines the distribution
of initial conditions, F(￿t￿1). So, if past policymakers had implemented the
best conditional policy rule, the current generation would face a less favorable
distribution of initial conditions, F(￿t￿1;et￿); than if the government had
implemented the best unconditional policy. Thus, there is a trade-o⁄between the
best policy and the most desirable distribution from which the initial conditions
are drawn. On average the economy is better o⁄when the government implements
the unconditionally optimal policy.
Conditionally optimal policy pc is credible if government minimizes the
conditional loss function, EtLt; as is unconditionally optimal policy, pu; if
government minimizes the unconditional loss function, e ELt: Which policy the
government should adopt is a rather philosophical question as is the value of the
21social discount factor (see for example Somers (1971) and Barro (1999)). However,
although in this example both policies are credible and sustainable, that is not so
when forward looking structural equations are present. We now turn to that case.
3.3. Example with Forward-looking Phillips curve
We consider an optimal policy for problem (2.18), (2.19) and policy in the form
of (3.7)5
￿t = ￿yt + cyt￿1; (3.7)
which nests the timeless perspective policy when c = 1; and the unconditionally
optimal policy when c = ￿: For simplicity, let et be i.i.d. with zero mean and
￿nite dispersion, ￿2:
At any time period t the information is described by the pair (yt￿1;et); and
without loss of generality the output gap, yt; may be written as
yt = dyt￿1 + ￿et; (3.8)
which in combination with (3.7) results in a dynamic relation for in￿ ation as
follows:
￿t = (c ￿ d)yt￿1 ￿ ￿et; (3.9)
Et￿t+1 = (c ￿ d)yt:








1 + ￿c ￿ ￿d
￿
et: (3.10)
We may now solve for coe¢ cients d and ￿ combining (3.8) with (3.10)
5We consider this class of policy for simplicity. The general policy would have the form
￿t = ￿myt + cyt￿1: However, to prove that a particular policy is not the optimal one, it is
enough to show that there is a dominant policy from class (3.7).
22d =
(c ￿ d)
(1 + ￿c ￿ ￿d)
=
d =


































which achieves its minimum when c = ￿:
Now we will calculate the conditional expected discounted value of losses.

















1 ￿ d2 : (3.13)




































(c ￿ d) + a
￿


























which achieves its minimum when c = 1; which corresponds to Woodford￿ s timeless
perspective policy.
However, in general the best policy, c, depends on the three variables
(et;xt￿1;￿) and is not invariant to initial conditions. Below we provide the
numerical calculation for optimal c:



























Conditionally optimal time-consistent policy s=1
et=1
et=0
Figure 3.1: Conditionally Optimal Parameter policy, c; for time consitent policy



























Figure 3.2: Conditional loss function for di⁄erent policies
25Figure 3.1 shows the policy parameter, c, for the best policy in class (3.7 ). It
is easy to see that the optimal policy parameter, c, is di⁄erent from one, c 6= 1;
which corresponds to the timeless perspective policy. Figure 3.2 presents the value
of the corresponding conditional loss function. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate
again that the conditionally optimal policy is not conditionally consistent. At the
same time, the timeless perspective policy is not sustainable with respect to the
conditional loss function. Therefore, one cannot use the conditional criteria for
choosing time-consistent optimal policy.
4. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we develop a simple and intuitive procedure for uncovering the
unconditionally optimal policy that is applicable to a wide variety of examples
currently of interest in the literature. UO-policy is time-consistent, conditionally
consistent and optimal on the class of rules under consideration. We argued
that this perspective on optimal policy formulation is attractive and in this we
seem to be going back to a perspective urged by Taylor (1979) and Whiteman
(1986) in seminal analyses of policy formulation in linear, rational expectations
macroeconomic models. In a particular monetary policy example we showed that
UO-policies result, on the average, in higher welfare when one uses the asymptotic
loss function as the criterion of policy. However, we also demonstrated that even
when time-consistency is not a problem (when the economy, unrealistically, is
characterized purely by backward-looking dynamic relations) one may still o⁄er
a justi￿cation for the UO perspective on policy formulation. In the example
in section 3 the key di⁄erence between the two classes of policies (conditionally
optimal versus unconditionally optimal) showed up in the distribution of initial
in￿ ation.
265. Appendix
5.1. An Example With Backward Looking Phillips Curve
This appendix spells out the analysis of the model economy discussed in Section
3.2 of the paper. We recall that the et shocks are i.i.d. and distributed as N(0;￿2):
Consequent on the recursive structure of the model, we note that at any point in
time, t, the state of the economy may be described by the pair (￿t￿1;et).
Therefore, government policy may be written as (5.1)
￿t = d￿t￿1 + ￿et: (5.1)
Then, combining (5.1) with (3.2) we receive
yt = (d ￿ 1)￿t￿1 + (￿ + 1)et; (5.2)
Etyt+1 = (d ￿ 1)￿t: (5.3)
5.1.1. Best unconditional policy
Let us now consider the best unconditional policy (3.5). Combining this with
(5.3) we receive
(2 ￿ d)￿t = ￿yt: (5.4)
Plugging (5.1) and (5.2) into (5.4) we receive (5.5)
(2 ￿ d)(d￿t￿1 + ￿et) = ￿(d ￿ 1)￿t￿1 ￿ (￿ + 1)et; (5.5)
which implies the following restrictions for coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿
(2 ￿ d)d = ￿(d ￿ 1); (5.6)
(2 ￿ d)￿ + ￿ = ￿1: (5.7)
27>From these relations we receive that:
























5.1.2. Best conditional policy
We now consider the best conditional policy, (3.4). Combining this with (5.3) we
receive (5.10)
￿t = ￿yt + ￿ (d ￿ 1)￿t: (5.10)
Then, combining (5.1) with (3.2) and (5.10) we receive (5.11)
(1 ￿ ￿ (d ￿ 1))(d￿t￿1 + ￿et) = ￿(d ￿ 1)￿t￿1 ￿ (￿ + 1)et: (5.11)
Just as before, this relations delivers useful information on parameters ￿ and ￿




￿ (2 ￿ ￿ (d ￿ 1)) = ￿1:
We can solve these as follows
d = dc =







28And so, the optimal policy then will result in the following dynamic paths:





















We can ￿nd E￿2

















>From (5.12) we may easily conclude that the dispersion of ￿t is smaller when d
is smaller, and that therefore it is smaller when the government employs the
unconditionally optimally policy as compared with the conditionally optimal
policy.
Plugging (5.15) into (5.14) we receive the ￿nal expression for unconditional

























d2 ￿ 3d + 1
(1 ￿ d2)
2 ;
29which is zero when d = du
5.1.4. Conditional expectation
Now we can calculate the conditional expectation of the loss function, which can















￿t = d(￿t￿1 ￿ et): (5.17)




























1 ￿ d2 :





























And ￿nally, it can then be shown that this can be simpli￿ed as
EtLt =











It is easy then to show that for any exogenously given ￿t￿1; it achieves its minimum
at d = dc:
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